A theory of expenditure control toward ultimate naval objectives by O'Connor, Michael G.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1954
A theory of expenditure control toward ultimate naval objectives.
O'Connor, Michael G.





The purpose of this paper is to present a theory of expenditure
analysis and control that the writer believes will prove useful to comptrollers
or fiscal directors of the naval service, in overcoming the following two
unsatisfactory aspects of naval management:
1. Imbalances in both manpower and material supply in related forces
and operations, which result in failure to fully realize the potential strength
available.
2. The practice of operating personnel at many planning levels to
regard expenditure analysis and control solely as a budgetary or logistic
accounting consideration, which results in failure to employ the financial or
economic factor in command decisions.
The writer has concluded that these two difficulties stem from:
1. Original imbalances in budget programs because of lack of corre-
lation with operations in planning, followed by divergence in expenditure due
to lack of coordination of logistic effort along the same lines as the
operations supported,
2. The lack of a method of translating expenditure or use of
resources into the operations or functions as they are planned and performed
by the operating forces.
The theory is not submitted as an alternate for either the present
navy budget or expenditure accounting at this time. If found useful in
application as a means of justifying budget requests or of classifying
expenditures, such develonement will itself point up the way and the extent
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to which it may supplant or suwolement present reporting systems.
The value of the theory lies in its possible usefulness as a
comptroller technique in advising and aiding naval command in making a balanced
selection of manpower, weapons and supporting material required for specific
operational purposes in the most desirable and economical manner, and
inefficient and economic utilization of these resources toward an assigned
military objective.
Due to a limited bibliography available on this subject, the writer
has based this theory on his naval experience and a contemplation of the
principles and practices presented by the various speakers both military and
civilian appearing during the first term of the Seminar on Comptrollership
at George Washington University* These have been supplemented by interviews
with officers of the Navy Comptroller's office and planning groups of the
Chief of Naval Operations and Joint staff. The courtesy and consideration of
all of these gentlemen is hereby acknowledged. It is desired particularly
to thank Rear Admiral E, W. Clexton and Captain C. Adair of the Navy
Comptroller's office for information on certain compilations of naval
financial reporting and Captains W, H, Ashford, R. L, Johnson, and Commander
R. J. Crowley of Naval Operations for information on operational systems
planning. This is not to say, however, that these officers approve or for
that matter disapprove of the theory or its exposition herewith, for both the
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The purpose of planning is to chart a path to an objective and by
analysis to predict the obstacles and pitfalls that may be encountered, and
to correlate and coordinate progress toward the objective so that the obstacles
may be mitigated and the pitfalls avoided.
Due to the varied nature of naval tasks whose accomplishment lead to
attainment of an objective, it is more often than not necessary to distribute
the planning among personnel of different capacities, technical skills or
experience. Further, since these tasks are rarely accomplished simultaneously
but in successive stages which are built one upon the other, planning of some
stages must wait upon earlier events or occurences. This is, of course, not
always true. Under certain conditions alternatives can be planned and later
executed as events advise or dictate. But even in these cases the selected
alternative must frequently be modified because it is not wholly satisfactory
or because even later events refuse to be controlled exactly as planned.
This division of planning among different groups at different levels
and at different times resolves into planning toward secondary objectives.
These secondary objectives are further subdivided, by the same process of
division of planning and operating responsibility into tertiary objectives and
so on down the various echeleons of staff and line.
In the development of these different divisions of planning and in the
later accomplishment of the operations planned, there is danger of losing sight
of the purposes of these secondary objectives. Yet the degree of success or
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measure of accomplishment of the ultimate objective depends not only on the
attainment of these secondary objectives but on how, when, and to what extent
they are attained. As means or steps to a common end, the results of these
secondary objectives are usually dependent on one another in timing and degree
of accomplishment. Lack of development in one or more will prevent full
utilization of the attainment of others. Conversely over attainment of one
may be a waste of time and resources and when done at the expense of another
the error is compounded.
In a large and widespread organization, such as the naval service,
both of these dangers are ever present. The most practical defense against
these dangers is the correlation of all planning and coordination of ensuing
operations by relation to the ultimate purpose for which they are intended.
But this correlation of planning and coordination of accomplishment is easier
to conceive than to obtain. The necessity of budgeting and expending along
program lines to gain the advantage of consolidation of technical skill and
large scale acquisition is granted, but, this also tends to obscure the timirg
and volume relationships to the operations they service and consequently to
the effect on the results that the operations are to obtsin. In essence
concentration (in support planning) down the vertical columns of the programs
detracts from the view along the horizontal lines of operational usage.
Similarly concentration (in operational planning) along the horizontal lines
of operational implementation will blind the operator to the trends of the
vertical columns with which he must merge . NOT HURDLE in his path to the
objective.
In order to clarify and to synchronize the above cross relationships
and thus control the effect of one upon the other, expenditure planning and
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progress analysis as well as tactical or military planning and progress
analysis along the horizontal lines must be established in addition to the
present military cognizance down the vertical columns.
This will require both increase in centralization of control and in
detail of accounting. Realizing this, the degree to which control is cen-
tralized and accounting is exacted becomes the crux of the problem. It will
be necessary to steer between the Scylla of over simplification and the
Charybdis of complexity and pettifogging detail.
Yet such a course must be charted because only by this means can the
various programs and operations of our complex enterprise be kept in proper
perspective and the components thereof adjusted to provide mutual support
and prevent mutual interference.

CHAPTER n
THE THEORY OF PARALLEL PLANNING
In the naval service of the United States there are generally-
speaking, three types of planning and performance of function. OPERATIONAL
LOGISTIC AND FINANCIAL. These, of course, can be further subdivided into the
various executive and functional headings, such as Strategic, Tactical and
training for Operations, Procurement, Storage and issue (including transport)
for Logistic and Budget Formulation and Execution for Financial. However, the
three major divisions cover the field. Operations are planned and executed.
Logistic requirements are determined and provision thereof attempted. Budgets
are prepared and funds apportioned. Logistics and Finance are joint, of
course, in the sense that all of the essentials required to perform operations
must be paid for at one time or another. The manpower, the ships, the planes,
the stores, the ammunition, the shore establishment, all are derived from
funds, the common denominator of our resources.
Therefore to insure the most efficient and economic attainment of
the ultimate objective of the Operational plan, the three forms of planning
and implementation should be paralleled and the relationship of both financial
and logistic planning and implementation extend to the final purposes they
support in the same manner as operational planning and execution.
But why is this essential? Cannot the military commander and his
staff determine and later conduct operations by only military evaluation of
the forces and materials available and required? The answer can be affirmative
if the forces and materials are already more than sufficient. This will
require no planning or control, just usage. Or it can be affirmative if the
commander is content later to mold his plans or modify his operation to the
:-
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forces and material which can be procured and furnished him. To illustrate:
Assume a Force Commander desires to move an aircraft squadron or unit to an
air station supporting his forces. If financial consideration is limited
to notification to the station commander of his intentions and request for
acquesience, the receipt of an affirmative (it will never be negative) answer
with reservations of dependency on receipt of additional funds or construction
will result in decision on operational feasibility alone. Then, unless, the
station is already overfunded (this is hardly possible since the funds
available have already been transmuted into uses for other purposes) then
subsequent operations of the unit will be controlled not so much by the
operational plans but by the support that can be furnished them. This may
or may not be operationally desirable. In addition the collateral effect on
the operations of other units based at the station may result (when their
impact is realized) in greater detriment to the final objectives of the Force
Commander than the operational value of the service the transferred unit can
now perform. The obvious answer of more support for the station will not
suffice. Timely supply of the correct type of manpower and material support
cannot be relied upon. The numerous levels of planning involved and the
diverse responsibility for the accomplishment of the various logistic
functions require tracing through the common thread of financial relationship,
to determine their complimentary capabilities. Otherwise the station
additional support may not be forthcoming in the amount or categories desired.
To develop this illustration further: The peacetime mission of a
major naval commander is to train and develop his command to perform specific,
selected tactical operations in war. The determination of the type and scope
of these operations are based on intelligence, geographical, meteorological
and strategic information together with an appraisal of enemy and own
,(
capabilities and future developments. This determination results formulation
and assignment of objectives. Neither logistic nor financial factors should
be considered in this initial formulation. The budget must not affect the
estimate of the situation nor limit the objectives.
But after the determination and assignment of objectives the logistic
and financial factors become major factors along the path to the objectives.
The selection of quantities and types of ships, planes and equipments to
accomplish the operations of the objectives must be supplied or scheduled for
supply. But the operating commander does not unilaterally select nor supply
his present or future requirements. He will become involved with the
logistic planning of CNO and the logistic supply of the naval bureaus as well
as the research and development concepts of both. The common denominator in
which all of these agencies deal is funds. Therefore, in the early stages of
his planning, translation of his projected operations (tactical and logistic)
into financial terms will facilitate correlation with the program funds of the
bureaus and indicate the extent of transmutation possible in later operations.
By this correlation, determination can be made of: (l) The probability of
his requirements and desired improvements being met. (2) The modifications
of his operations necessary to compensate for the inadequacies in program
funds or extension of operation to make full use of availability. (3) Action
or alternate action which he should recommend in allocation of funds depending
on possible future changes in funding. (4) A balanced selection of resources
best suited to his purposes. (5) The feasibility and desirability of
substitution in projected usages in manpower, weapons and equipment.
This introduces the financial or economic factor, which confronts the
service as a whole, into the command decision, at a point where it belongs,
not prior nor subsequent thereto. For unless this method of parallel planning
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is used, operational plans must be guided by fiscal certainties which limit
the commander to short range plans and disconnected operations. Alternatively
if he does wait upon fiscal certainties he must (without this planning) be
prepared to accept frustrating disappointments, possible lack of balance
between results of complimentary operations and makeshift changes of schedule
which will prevent full realization of his objectives. Obviously neither
restriction in planning nor preacceptance of subsequent modification in
operations will be acceptable. Therefore inoperation under limited resources
future distribution and utilization must be evaluated and governed by parallel
planning which guides both courses to the same ultimate objective.
Simultaneously, the planners of the Chief of Naval Material and the Naval
Bureaus will receive a plan of expenditure and fund allocation that parallels
the horizontal line of operations which can be meshed with the progress of
the vertical lines of their programs. Their financial operations are
forecasted and plotted along the same scale (both chronologically and
quantatively) as that of the operating forces. Control and readjustment of
the vertical programs to meet the horizontal operations at the points projected,
at the times desired, are facilitated by the relation to one another and to
common objectives. Effects can be predicted and causes controlled in
anticipation thereof.
Of equal significance is the effect of this planning on subordinate
echeleons both operational and logistic. Both the operational commander and
the material bureaus now have a matched expenditure control which can prevent
divergence from their projected progress. Improved guidance by the bureaus
of the logistic efforts of their subordinate echelons will not only balance
amounts of sapport but will also improve timing of delivery. Correspondingly
this can be matched by consistency in the requisitions and requests of the

operating forces. The operational commander now has a means of controlling
the competition between his subordinates for shares of support along program
lines and a means of aporaising a unit's value in relation to its cost.
Efficient and economical and supply of requirements cannot be left
to individual demands or individual responsiveness. It must be guided by-
establishment of corresponding relationship of purposes at similar stages
of planning of the three major functional divisions so that parallel planning
is followed by parallel progress.

CHAPTER III
THE THEORY IN PARALLEL PROGRESS ANALYSIS
The ease of relating costs of various operations to the value of their
contribution to the sale of the final product or service is one of the
advantages of the profit yardstick in private enterprise. In this sense
profit has a double value, it not only expresses a goal but also furnishes
a means of reviewing progress toward that goal. Since the ultimate objective
of a private business is already expressed in financial terms, the analysis
of operations in financial terms is relatively easy to translate in progress
toward the objective. This facilitates managerial decision in determining
action to be taken in regard to a function whose cost is questionable or whose
value is doubtful. However, if only profit (attainment of the final objectire )
is used as a measure of satisfactory operation, then it has a paradoxical
value. In this case attainment of a profit tends to discourage investigation
and analysis that might result in still larger success.
The danger of this tendency lulling management into a false sense of
efficiency and economy in operation is magnified in non-profit enterprises or
public service. Not only because of the lack of the profit barometer but also
because of the failure to translate the successive stages of progress into
financial terms, as they occur, for analysis and control. For, in any
enterprise, public or private, if the value of a specific operation or function
to the over all or final objective is appraised, its proportionate consumption
of total resources can be evaluated (by comparison) for control or judgement
of areas tf'nere improvement in operations is necessary.
--
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This appraisal is complicated in all enterprises by the nature of
the costs involved. Direct costs can be relatively easily identified with
a particular performance or acquisition. Indirect costs are difficult to
trace to any specific project or to evaluate in terms of performance. They
are generally attributed to the cost of operations as a whole and accepted
or denied on the basis of fund availability alone. Yet it is in this area
of indirect costs that the greatest danger of inefficient or uneconomic use cf
resources lies. This is also liable to be the greater of the two cost areas
in operational cost3. Thus inability or unwillingness to segregate, relate
and control the costs of the indirect area may well overcome the advantage
gained by strict evaluation and control of direct costs. While it is granted
that exigencies of military operations, at times, require expenditure without
close scrutiny of the amount and detailed use of the funds provided, the
sooner this expenditure (this apolies to direct as well as indirect costs)
is analyzed and related to the functions it supoorts and those functions
evaluated as to their contribution to the ultimate objective the sooner factual
determination of the need to increase decrease, eliminate or continue the
expenditure can be made.
In naval expenditure accounting, costs are related primarily to
programs in order to provide historical background and a point of departure
for computing and allocating future similar program costs. This facilitates
the compilation of the performance budget but as pointed out in the previous
chapter it concentrates on secondary objectives the programs. This obscures
the relationship of indirect costs to the purposes of direct costs and fails
to provide a direct linkage to operations that can be used as an indicator





The two principles of efficient and economical operation: (l) Control
of costs of a component in relation to its contributory value to the objective.
(2) Timely reflection of operational modifications and changes in programs;
require constant and simultaneous analysis of operational, logistic and
financial progress toward the objectives. Since these objectives are not just
to maintain ships afloat, planes airborne, or stations in operation, but the
employment of these components in accomplishment of strategical function or
tactical training, it is necessary to control the expenditures (required
costs) in consonance with the operations they support. The means of controlling
direct costs are under the cognizance of the operational commander. The
indirect costs of operations are controlled by the Naval Bureaus. Successful
as well as economical operation depend on both. Joint and coordinated control
can be obtained by progress analysis of: (l) utilization of components
(2) performance in this utilization and (3) expenditures incurred in this
utilization. This parallel progress analysis will also furnish the indicators
of changes required in indirect expenditures. Since linkage has been
established by financial relationship in parallel planning a change in operations
or in support function will signal the necessity of a corresponding change in
related operations or programs. As in parallel planning, parallel progress
review should not be used to limit a function solely because of cost but as
a means of weighing desirability by proportionate costs and determining
feasibility and desirability of maintaining the present progress of manpower
and material programs when compared with new developments. As in parallel
planning this results in a control that will resynchronize divergence in the




THE THEORY IN PRACTICE
A satisfactory exposition of the application of the theory cannot be
done apriori. It will remain a thesis until applied. However, principles
of application can be stated and a tentative approach based on presently
existing reporting and accounting systems can be outlined.
In practice the application of the theory would necessarily be
gradual, operation by operation, function by function lest the complexity of
preparation for an overall application discourage continuation before
realization is attained. In this connection both initial and continuing
care must be taken to avoid the possibility of overemphasis of detail in
reporting and accounting to the point of diminishing return on the effort
expended.
The first step in application is the formulation and statement of the
objectives. The statement must be in terms of specific military accomplishment
and must be precise. Intangible or generalized objectives cannot serve as
goals for objective planning. The objectives may be stated in terms of a
mission or of specific tasks, preferably the latter, in any case the statement
must express or unmistakably indicate the action expected to follow.
The second step is the grouping and alignment of the components
both of operation and support into a system of related performances. This
means of correlation and coordination of components has already been
established in DCNO(AIR) OP-55 and has proven of value as an operational









in part will simplify this step of application. However, if this is not
considered suitable to the particular situation under study a system can be
constructed from operational plans and previous experience.
The third step is the selection of leading or governing components
to serve as focal points of control. These should be those components most
essential to the operation and/ or those whose variation will affect the
greatest number of other components.
The fourth step is the determination of data required, a comparison
with that already available or forthcoming and selection of the means of
obtaining that still required. Here, it must be remembered that the purpose
of this analysis is not to uncover minor errors in usage of particular funds.
If subsequent review indicates lack of economy then investigation or other
steps may be employed to analyze and correct. The purpose here is to
segregate and align costs for comparative evaluation and prediction of the
effects of utilization or expenditure with a view to controlling causes. Here
the scope of the analysis should not be more than that sufficient to segregate
costs of entities of performance or function that can be dealt with
individually.
Completion of the fourth step launches parallel planning. To
illustrate implementation of these planning steps and an abridged application
of the theory, we can focus on a particular type of operation now being
conducted in both major fleets: The ASW training of a task group in convoy
protection.
















6. Tactics (training exercises)
7. Supporting stations
8. Research.
The formulation of objectives is based upon:
1. Study of enemy capabilities (Intelligence)
2. Appraisal of own capabilities.
3. Geographical, aerological, and oceanographical information
4. Evaluation of probable (in the forseeable future) developments
in both enemy and own capability.
These functions, components and formulatory information are the
factors and tools of operational planning.
The OBJECTIVES (as formulated by assumption) are:
(1) Conduct exercises each month, in area .
(2) Conduct joint training exercises —— bi-annually, for one week in
areas —
.
The logistic and financial planners now become part of the team. The
comptroller as the financial planner will probably arrange his tools of







1, Existing facilities (SHIPS PLANES STATIONS)
2. Existing personnel
3» Existing inventories.




Ship Building and Conversion








50000 Stores Purchases and Transfers
60000 Manufacturing for Stores
90000 Miscellaneous accounts as applicable.
Assuming that national manpower (personnel) controls are not effective and
that there is a limit to the monetary appropriations available, the comptroller




Admittedly this selection is a matter of opinion. Under certain circumstances
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Tactics would control areas and hence the supporting stations. Cube and
weight of certain weapons or equipments may govern planes. The selection
given is arbitrary but is justified on the basis of being the more difficult
of obtaining and hence the governing components.
The final step in the comptrollers preparation is the selection of
data. Precise selection can on3y be determined in actual application.
Practical considerations of national political and fiscal policy must guide
a reasonable selection. To be concerned about the cost of construction of a
battleship even though this represents a sizeable capital investment in an
operation would be foolish. The cost of alteration of a destroyer or an
airplane to accommodate a new detection equipment would be another matter,
the availability or non-availability of sufficient funds in the next overhaul
application may determine the requirement for additional funds in station
operation for training operations or maintenance personnel. A tentative
selection might be:
Shins - Detailed or estimated costs of; Supplies-Overhaul Emergency
Repairs - Fuel, Water and utilities - Training Ammunition -
Personnel (include Commissary etc.) -
Alterations* - Research Projects*
Planes - Procurement - Supplies - Overhaul - Repairs - Fuel and Oil.
Personnel - Alterations* - Research Projects*
Personnel - Allowances and Complements - Training schools and Courses.
Weapons
- Procurement - Repair and Alteration - Research Projects*
Equipments











Supporting Stations - Operating function - Administrative function
Housekeeping function - Transportation function
Communication function - Supply function
Construction and alteration of facilities*
Applies only to pertinent projects.
A desirable method of illustrating the application of the theory of
parallel planning is by chart. A similar chart could be prepared by the
comptroller in presenting his avaluation to operational planners or to command
for a decision. In the chart shown (Illustration l) the vertical columns
represent program funds (in appropriate dollar units such as thousands).
The horizontal lines represent Exercises by functions of the particular
operation to be planned. The length of the horizontal lines is not pertinent,
nor scaled. If desired, the horizontal dimension of the entire chart can be
used to indicate the time interval in which the exercises must be conducted.
These horizontal lines are first arranged from top to bottom in order of
importance or value to the final objective. The order of the horizontal lines
may later be re-arranged in different combinations to present different
possibilities in planning. The order selected is, however, a reasonalbe point
of departure, since the extent of the vertical columns downward indicates the
amount of resources available from aopropriations. The points at which the
horizontal lines cut the vertical columns are the important points of the
presentation. These are determined by the cumulative (from top to bottom)
estimated costs of the exercises listed on the left of each horizontal line.
The segment of the horizontal line contained in each vertical column
represents the total costs of the exercises in the category of that particular
column. For example the costs of exercises A, B and C in ship funds
18
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(operation Overhaul etc.) are plotted along the ship fund column and the
A, B and C line drawn through this point. The costs for exercises 1, 2 and 3
are added to those of A, B and C and the cumulative total plotted down the
column and line 1, 2 and 3 drawn through this point. When the exercises
do not have costs applicable to the column then the line is broken at that
column ( shown for station column) . The chart now shows those exercises which
are fully funded (those whose horizontal lines are cut by vertical columns)
and those which are not and in which categories they are lacking. It further
indicates the corrective actions possible. If request for further funds is
considered, the amount necessary and the budget activity involved can be
traced back through the vertical column. If more economical operation is
desired the exercises can be further divided into additional lines (retaining
the same functional identification on the right) , and the lines rearranged
to obtain the most horizontal vertical intersections consistent with a
balanced accomplishment of all functions, or a combination of the two methods
may be tried if deemed feasible. If the combinations will become numerous
a mechanical device constructed along the lines of the chart may be devised
and used.
In the last analysis, however, the relative operational importance of
the function, or the relative value of the exercise to the function can
determine the vertical order of the lines. Then all exercises remaining below
the lowest point of any vertical line should be eliminated and the funds
remaining in the columns that will not now be used for these operations,
diverted to other operations or purposes that utilize funds of the same
vertical column heading. Since the exercise cannot accomplish its ultimate





After command decision of the exercise to be conducted and the plans
promulgated, parallel progress review can be conducted by similar relationship.
A graphic relationship between expenditure planned and operational progress by-
functions or exercises can be drawn (Illustration II). Divergence in progress
or variation is projected progress can then be controlled by application of
either operational or financial control as appears desirable.
The example given above is hypothetical, however, the principle can
be applied to almost any operation or function, large or small, operational or
logistic at any command or planning level. The degree of satisfaction that
will be obtained is dependent on ability to estimate, segregate and relate
costs. It is illustrative only, as stated in the beginning of the chapter,
realization of the applicability of the theory to an actual case will of itself











In summary it is desired to emphasize certain conclusions of the writer
which were either the reasons for writing this paper or were formed during its
preparation. These conclusions are:
1. In order to meet the complex demands of naval operations under the
present and probable future limited monetary resources that can be made
available for their support, it will be necessary not only to examine
every area that may be improved in efficiency and economy but also to
give a great deal of attention to detail in this examination. Neglect
and deliberate waste or misapplication of funds are rare and when they
do occur, they can be discovered and corrected by means already available.
Only by detailed examination of all areas including those previously
believed to be incapable of or immune to financial research can we exploit
our available resources to the fullest extent and yet preserve an adequate
supply for probable future greater need.
2. That improvement in computing, monitoring and supplying the require-
ments of the operating forces can be accomplished by the introduction of
parallel financial planning and progress review into the operational chain
of command at all stages of planning and levels of command whose decisions
will have a significant effect on the action required in the management
or logistic chain.
3. That introduction of this parallel planning can best be done by
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correlating and coordinating operational logistic and financial planning
toward the ultimate objectives of the various stages of and levels of
planning and execution.
4. That the expenditure control that may be established as a result of
this parallel planning will be a control that can be understood and applied
in consonance by controlling personnel engaged in either operational,
logistic or financial planning at any level.
5. That this control will assist in more efficient and economic attain-
ment of the ultimate objectives of the navy. These objectives are the
purpose for which the personnel, ships, planes, and materials are used
rather than the maintenance and operation of these objects themselves.
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